Whither Philosophy?

Fifty years ago C.P. Snow gave a lecture at Cambridge University entitled “The Two Cultures.”¹ The gist of that lecture was that a wide and worrisome gap had developed in Western society between the sciences and the humanities. During and after World War II Snow had helped conduct interviews of thousands of British scientists and engineers. When he asked his subject what books they had read, their typical reply was: “I’ve tried a bit of Dickens.”² Humanists, he had discovered through less structured encounters, were equally ignorant when it came to science. He surmised that they had about as much insight into modern physics as their Neolithic ancestors.³ Snow put much of the blame for this gap on overspecialization in education. He worried that the house of Western culture had become so deeply divided that it was losing its capacity to keep pace with Russia and China and to “think with wisdom” in a world of accelerating social change where the rich “live precariously among the poor.”⁴

Today the gap today between the sciences and the humanities is wider than ever and the troubles of the world have grown more complicated. (I sometimes long for the predictable rivalries of the Cold War.) Our collective capacity “to think with wisdom” is no greater than it was fifty years ago, and education has done little to make scientists more appreciative of the humanities or humanists more conversant with the sciences.

Still there are a few bright spots. The Association for Core Texts and Courses (ACTC), I am proud to say, ran a successful three-year curriculum and faculty development project on Bridging the Gap between the Humanities and Sciences, and is now applying for a new twelve-month grant. I am also pleased to see that a number of the presentations at this conference deal with texts and in science and mathematics. One of the strengths of ACTC is that it invites each of us to apply the scholarly tools we bring from our disciplines to the rich materials afforded by core texts for the express purpose of building bridges with scholars from other fields. We build
these bridges at a modest cost, and they are never “bridges to nowhere.” As the new President of ACTC, I am eager to see us continue our leadership in bringing scientists and humanists closer together. I will have more to say about this and other expressions of ACTC’s mission toward the end of my talk, but first I want to focus on a “two cultures” problem that is peculiar to my own discipline, philosophy.

When non-philosophers think about philosophy they tend to think of it as the *history* of philosophy. They think of it as a succession of eminent philosophers —along, of course, with the theories those philosophers developed, the texts they wrote, and the movements they inspired. Socrates, Plato and Aristotle are frequent favorites. After that, the lists vary according to taste and background, but there are some philosophers who seem never to get on these lists. I have found, for example, that a good way of killing conversations with non-philosophers is to ask what they think of Willard Quine or Saul Kripke. Since Quine and Kripke are among the most influential American philosophers of the past fifty years, there is reason to wonder why they are not better known outside of philosophy.

One reason for their extramural obscurity is suggested by an imperious quip attributed to Quine. He is credited with saying: “There are two kinds of philosophers, those who are interested in the history of philosophy and those who are interested in philosophy.” What is intimated here is that the history of philosophy is not really philosophy and those who pursue it are not really philosophers. Quine knew full well that philosophy departments were expected to conduct research and teach classes in the history of philosophy, but he did not think that service of that kind had much to do with the proper business of philosophy—working out solutions to philosophical problems like “What is there?” and “What can we know?” In other words, he saw
two cultures *within* philosophy: a can-do culture akin to mathematics and science; and a can-teach culture akin to the humanities.

As a humanist and historian of philosophy I am tempted to dismiss Quine’s dichotomy as false. I am ready to point out that philosophy, unlike the natural sciences, is the custodian of its own history. Astrophysicists do not think it is their task to write histories of astrophysics. They relegate that task to historians of science—a branch of learning that belongs to the humanities. Philosophers, on the other hand, are jealous guardians of this duty and, thus, of their own footing in the humanities. I am also disposed to argue that every chapter in the history of philosophy is an experiment from which we can learn valuable lessons. I am inclined to insist that retelling the story of philosophy can be a powerful way of doing and critiquing philosophy. But these objections may miss a deeper point. Perhaps Quine’s dichotomy should be construed, not as an imperious quip, but as a provocative way of raising an Aristotelian question about the telos—the *good*—of philosophy. Is the *telos* of philosophy to solve problems in the manner of the natural sciences or is it to produce a rich succession of inspiring texts and ideas?

The answer I would like to give is “Both!” Unfortunately, both alternatives face significant difficulties. The first alternative is compromised by the fact philosophers have not succeeded in 2500 years in reaching agreement on the solution to a single, central philosophical problem by means of philosophical methods or argument. Scientists, by contrast, have enjoyed spectacular success in reaching *provisional* agreement on a wide range of problems and changing the face of the world with technological applications. I emphasize the word *provisional* for agreement in science is always subject to revision when warranted by new evidence. If you had asked astrophysicists twelve ago what the universe is made of, they would have said “matter and energy” and referred you to the “standard model” of particles and forces (plus gravity) to
describe the details. Today, most astrophysicists will tell you that that ordinary matter and energy make up only about 5% of what there is. The rest, they now say, is dark matter and dark energy—elusive stuff whose origin and characteristics remain unknown. Again, this is provisional knowledge, but it is the best answer we can get now, because it fits the relevant data better than any previous answer. To page back in the history of science for an answer one finds more congenial or inspiring would be foolishness.

The case with philosophy is very different. If you ask philosophers “What there is?” you will get a multitude of competing answers—including the answer, “it’s a matter of faith.” and Quine’s deflationary analysis, “to be is to be the value of a bound variable.” What you will not get is consensus, provisional or otherwise. Plato complained that the quarrels of philosophers discredited the search for wisdom. Two thousand years later, Descartes drew an even bleaker picture and set out to fix it: “As to philosophy,” he wrote,” it [has] been cultivated for many centuries by men of the most outstanding ability, and none the less there is not a single thing of which it treats which is not still in dispute, and nothing therefore, which is free from doubt.”

Until a few decades ago most philosophers nurtured the hope that a revolution in methodology or reforms in standards of practice could change this picture. Ludwig Wittgenstein, whom Bertrand Russell accused of having “the pride of Lucifer,” claimed in 1921 to have “found, on all essential points, the final solution of the problems [of philosophy].” Eleven years later, the English pragmatist F.C.S. Schiller predicted that if philosophers selected for their “open-mindedness, honesty, and good temper” were brought together for “thorough and systematic discussion” under conditions that encouraged mutual understanding and the working out of differences, “they could clear up and clear away a majority of the questions which cast a slur on Philosophy in considerably less than . . . five to ten years.” Philosophers today are far
more skeptical about the chances for philosophical consensus. Few think that agreement on central problems will ever be realized and some declare openly that philosophical problems are unsolvable\textsuperscript{11} or at least unsolvable for human brains.\textsuperscript{12}

Given philosophers’ failure to reach agreement and the erosion of hope that this might one day change, the second alternative seems all the more appealing. If the telos of philosophy is to produce a rich succession of inspiring texts and ideas, then it may be a plus that the ingenious worldviews and critical insights that philosophers have developed over the centuries don’t converge. Aristotle’s teleological worldview fell from favor a long time ago, but it remains a majestically coherent way of thinking about ourselves and the world we inhabit. Berkeley’s arguments that one cannot prove the existence of material substances have never been decisively refuted—not even by Samuel Johnson’s petulant kicking of a rock. But practically no one today accepts Berkeley’s conclusion that all that exists are minds and ideas.

Seen from this angle, the beauty of philosophy is very much like the beauty of poetry. I don’t share Milton’s theology—though I am sometimes tempted to believe that Satan invented gunpowder—but I am happy to share the world he envisioned. Milton’s world is a kind of refuge, a place where the ways of God and the woes of man are united in poetic intelligibility. Sometimes I like to slip into Kafka’s world, a nightmarish warren where earnest people strive in vain to get on with their lives in the face of hopeless odds and cosmic silence. (Kafka consoles me for having to commute on the New Jersey Turnpike.) I also like to roam Joyce’s Dublin where microcosm becomes microcosm and the mundane is transfigured into the mythic. Each of these worlds is remarkable in its own right, but it would be foolish to ask which represents the consensus of poets or the best answer to date in light of relevant evidence.

So why not treat philosophy the same way? Jean-Paul Sartre is among my favorite
philosophers. At a time when other philosophers were trying to dissolve the problem of consciousness by reducing it to something else, Sartre put it at the center of his philosophy. In his most important work, *Being and Nothingness*, he called consciousness “Nothingness” (*le Néant*) to emphasize that it is a non-substantial being that can exist only as a revelation of something other than itself. What flows from this is a rich worldview that includes, among other things, a radical theory of free will and an original framework for psychoanalysis. Sartre’s world is as atheistic and pessimistic as Milton’s is theistic and hopeful. He closes the main body of *Being and Nothingness* with these words: “Thus the passion of man is the opposite of that of Christ, for man loses himself as man so that God can be born. But the idea of God is contradictory, and we lose ourselves in vain. Man is a useless passion.”

Now, as much as I admire the gritty originality of Sartre’s picture of the world, I find it unconvincing in many respects. I doubt the usefulness of treating consciousness as its own kind of being. I am not convinced that human beings have as much free will as Sartre claimed. I find his psychoanalytic theory naïve. I don’t think the concept of God is contradictory. And I believe the pessimism of *Being and Nothingness* had more to do with temper of the times—the darkest days of World War II—than with anything basic to Sartre’s understanding of the human condition. Sartre himself confirmed this by turning his pessimism into optimism after the liberation of Paris. Today the gloominess of Sartre’s writing before 1945 is more likely to elicit smiles than shudders. Perhaps, nothing illustrates this more cheerfully than Danny Shanahan’s 1991 *New Yorker* cartoon “The Letters of Jean-Paul Sartre to his Mother.” A stocky Mme. Sartre stands before an empty rural mailbox. A balloon shows us her thoughts: “Sacre bleu! Again with the nothingness, and on my birthday, yet!”
I have talked about Sartre in some detail as a way illustrating my own comfort with looking at philosophy through the lens of history and appreciating the power and originality of individual philosophers without worrying about consensus on the solution to philosophical problems. I must confess that I have been looking at philosophy this way for a long time. I started college as a physics major, but after causing a nasty explosion in a chemistry lab, I was counseled to seek a major in which I was likely to do less harm. Philosophy seemed like a safe haven, especially if one stuck to the task of studying and teaching the ideas of eminent philosophers rather than trying to solve philosophical problems.

As the years went by, I realized that you can take the lad out the lab but you can’t take the lab out of the lad. I never lost my interest in science or my reservations about the capacity of philosophy to secure knowledge of the world through methods independent of empirical research. Luckily, my style as a teacher was to celebrate what was best in each philosophical text, and my duties as a dean insulated me from thinking very deeply about anything. But things began to unravel several years ago, when I started to write a book called Why Philosophers Can’t Agree. It occurred to me that my historical outlook embodied a historical distortion. One may treat philosophers like Plato, Aristotle, and Descartes as akin to great poets, but that is not how they saw themselves. They wanted to answer philosophical questions and to do so in ways that would be persuasive to anyone who was willing and able to follow their arguments. In essence, they agreed with Quine that the telos of philosophy was to solve its problems rather than to celebrate its history.

So the second alternative cannot stand on its own. In order to do justice to the history of philosophy we need to acknowledge the priority that nearly all celebrated philosophers have given to problem-solving and try to explain why they have failed to reach agreement. My own
explanation for the persistence of philosophical disagreement has multiple facets, but I shall mention only two. One is that philosophers often strive to acquire knowledge with characteristics that may be impossible for humans to obtain: knowledge that is categorical, essentialistic, and necessarily true. Another facet is that philosophers lack a process for discarding theories.

Stephen Jay Gould, who was both a biologist and a historian of biology, observed that “Science advances primarily by replacement, not by addition. If the barrel is always full, then the rotten apples must be discarded before better ones can be added.” Scientists, unlike philosophers, rely on the testing of empirical predictions extracted from their theories to help them reach agreement on what theories to discard. The process is sometimes messy, and its implementation varies from one science to another, but it works surprisingly well. Philosophers are not blind to their lack of a comparable discarding process. They joke among themselves about the dean who was chiding the physics department for spending too much money on lab equipment. “Why can’t you be more like the math department?” she asked. “All they ask for are pencils, paper, and wastebaskets. Or, better yet, why can’t you be like the philosophy department? All they ask for are pencils and paper.”

Philosophers generally rely on reasoning and intuition to debate the relative superiority of philosophical theories, but they have never succeeded in developing a process that commands consensus on which theories must be removed from the apple barrel of provisional knowledge and tossed into the wastebasket of history. Perhaps, the closest they come is tacit agreement that some theories are no longer interesting.

Is my explanation surprising? For many philosophers today it may seem little more than a confirmation of the truism that philosophy isn’t science. But the methodological chasm
between philosophy and science, now so familiar to us, is the culmination of a fissure that was still being formed a century ago. It is worth noting that over twenty-five percent of Aristotle’s extant writings are biological treatises and that they are heavily empirical in content. Descartes, who was best known in his own day as a mathematician and physicist, dissected animal carcasses to study the interaction of brains and bodies. The arch-experimentalist Robert Boyle wrote essays on moral philosophy. David Hume subtitled his *Treatise of Human Nature*: “*Being an Attempt to Introduce the Experimental Method of Reasoning into Moral Subjects.*” Had Kant died before he wrote the *Critique of Pure Reason*, his most original work would have been his essays in astronomy. Adam Smith was influential as an ethicist, and John Stuart Mill as an economist. William James was trained as a medical doctor and helped to found modern psychology. His celebrated treatise *The Principles of Psychology* (1890) was used as a textbook in *both* psychology and philosophy classes.

Is consensus in philosophy possible? I believe philosophers could achieve agreement on at least some of their central problems, if they were willing to formulate theories that yielded predictions as testable as those in science. How this might work in practice has barely been explored, but some promising steps have been suggested by a new movement called experimental philosophy. Philosophers often appeal to intuitions as critical links in their arguments, but they seldom explain what intuitions are or why we should rely on them. Experimental philosophy borrows techniques from experimental psychology to gather systematic data on philosophically interesting intuitions: intuitions, such as what counts as knowledge or under what circumstances a person is morally responsible. It takes armchair pronouncements about what is “obvious to all” or “natural to believe” and tests them against the reported intuitions of actual subjects. It sets up experiments that are designed to discover whether
variations in intuitions correlate with contingencies such as a subject’s cultural, linguistic, or socio-economic background.

One of the fringe benefits of experimental philosophy is that it lends itself to student participation. Last fall, I asked the students in my freshman seminar on *Morality, Mind, and Free Will* to join me in developing a survey designed to test John Stuart Mill’s thesis on qualitatively superior pleasures. In *Utilitarianism*, Mill contends it is better to be a dissatisfied human than a satisfied pig, a dissatisfied Socrates than a satisfied fool. In defense of this thesis he cites the “unquestionable fact”\(^\text{16}\) that those who have experienced both prefer the higher to the lower. He says: “no intelligent human being would consent to be a fool, no instructed person would be an ignoramus, no person of feeling and conscience would be selfish and base, even though they should be persuaded that the fool, the dunce, or the rascal is better satisfied with his lot than they are with theirs.”\(^\text{17}\) But are these preferences an “unquestionable fact”? My students and I found that the preferences collected by our survey were far more diverse and ambivalent than Mill predicted.

An intriguing question for me is whether philosophers would be willing to let their theories be discarded, if those theories yielded false predictions about the intuitions of appropriate subjects. Would an aesthetician be willing to give up a theory of art if it turned out that artists and art professionals had intuitions incompatible with the theory? Clive Bell argued that William Powell Firth’s popular painting *The Railway Station* was not art because it lacked “significant form.” Would Bell have been willing to give up his theory if painters, museum curators, and art historians found Firth’s painting to be a work of art?

There is considerable interest at present in the naturalization of philosophy and a spirited debate growing about the fruitfulness or futility of seeking wisdom from an armchair. Many
philosophers regard the very idea of trading the autonomy of philosophy for the promise of gaining science-like agreement as a Faustian bargain. But I think they overlook the riskiness that has always attended originality in philosophy and underestimate the toughness of philosophy’s soul. At the very least, an earnest effort to bridge the methodological gap between science and philosophy would be a thrilling experiment. Admittedly, not all experiments are successful. But this one might open a new chapter in the history of philosophy and help draw cognitive scientists into new areas of fruitful collaboration with philosophers.

You now know something about my work as a philosopher, but what about my hopes for the work of ACTC? Let me begin by affirming the mission that ACTC has forged for itself over the past fifteen years. As a founding member of ACTC’s advisory board, I have had the privilege of working closely with the two presidents that preceded me, Steve Zelnick and Phil Sloan. Steve and Phil are among the most able people I have ever known, and their contributions to ACTC have been exceptional. Steve had the original conception of ACTC and presided over its growth from a local consortium to an international organization. Phil presided over the maturation of ACTC into a multifaceted liberal arts organization that commands respect across North America and beyond. Scott Lee, the co-founder of ACTC and our Executive Director, developed ACTC into a fully professional association and has served ACTC throughout its history with unstinting dedication, boundless energy, and admirable ingenuity.

Their leadership backed by the enthusiastic support of the board, volunteers, and general membership has enabled ACTC to establish a unique place among academic associations and to offer services of a kind and quality that cannot be found elsewhere. We serve two kinds of members: individual and institutional. Our individual membership—nearly 300 strong—is drawn from faculty members and deans across the entire spectrum of higher education college.
Our institutional members now number 68 and include research universities, four-year colleges, comprehensive institutions, and community colleges. Our reach is international. We have long benefitted from the leadership of both Canadian and U.S. members. We now have the honor of counting the Universidad Tecnologico de Bolivar among our members and having two representatives from Chiao-tung University in Taiwan at this conference. In June, Scott will be addressing the Chinese University in Hong Kong and participating in a general education workshop with six other Hong Kong universities.

Our greatest challenge in the immediate future will be to sustain our success. The worldwide recession has led to deep cuts in academic budgets, and many educational associations are struggling with diminished support and shrinking attendance at their meetings. It is indicative of our strength that this conference is so well attended, but we can’t take this success for granted. To ensure that conference attendance continues to be strong we will need to reach out to new constituencies and increase the visibility of our conferences activities. You and I know that our annual conference provides a unique forum for scholars in virtually every field to share and compare substantive ideas formed in response to common readings, but we need to make sure that others know it as well. Eventually, I would like to see our membership climb to 400.

We also need to build bridges of mutual cooperation with other associations and to expand the circle of institutions that support ACTC. We need to continue our leadership, particularly through our Liberal Arts Institute, in helping institutions learn from one another how to construct successful core text programs. Our “Webligraphy” project will put a wealth of such information online, but it is through our programs and workshops we are most likely to foster institutional change. In coming months Scott and I will be writing you to ask for your
advice and assistance. If you prefer, you can reach us by using the email address on the ACTC website or by writing directly to me at The College of New Jersey. My address is:

rkamber@tcnj.edu

Why is all this worth doing? Why does the work of ACTC really matter? It is worth doing, in the first place, because it is a particularly fine way of living the examined life. It is worth doing because the use of core texts can be an especially effective way of helping students to become liberally educated. It is worth doing because a liberal education is an eminently practical education. Unlike C. P. Snow, I have not said much about the drawbacks of an overspecialized and illiberal education, but a moment’s reflection should make some of those drawbacks obvious. How can we expect financial executives to behave responsibly when they turn a blind eye to economic history and can’t (or won’t) recognize a bubble that is about to blow sky high. How can we expect the citizens we educate and the governments they elect to “think with wisdom” about turmoil in the Islamic world, if they know nothing of the religion, cultures, and history of that world? How can we expect our graduates to exercise good judgments about energy conservation or environmental protection if they lack basic scientific and technological knowledge? Of course, specialization is indispensable to the functioning of a modern society, but it needs to be leavened with liberal learning if we are to grasp the problems of our time in historical perspective and solve them with a sense of proportion.

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1 It was delivered as the Rede Lecture on May 7, 1959.

3 Ibid. p. 15.

4 Ibid. p. 50.


6 Willard V. O. Quine, “On What There Is” in *From a Logical Point of View*

7 Plato, *Republic* VII, 539b-c


14 His best known repudiation of his pessimistic assessment of the human condition was a lecture he gave at the Club Maintenant on October 28, 1945 under the title “Existentialism is a Humanism.” That lecture was published a few months later and has since become a classic.

